Florida Historical Quarterly
Volume 55
Number 2 Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol 55,
Number 2

Article 6

1976

Race Relations and Florida Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown
Decision
David R. Colburn

Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Historical Quarterly by an authorized editor of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Colburn, David R. (1976) "Race Relations and Florida Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown Decision,"
Florida Historical Quarterly: Vol. 55 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol55/iss2/6

Colburn: Race Relations and Florida Gubernatorial Politics Since the Brown

RACE RELATIONS AND
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school systems for black and white children. Reaction throughout
most of the South was swift, and among public officials it ranged
from hostility and bitterness to mild anger. Georgia’s Governor
Herman Talmadge was perhaps the most outspoken in his opposition to the decree: “The United States Supreme Court by its
decision today has reduced our Constitution to a mere scrap of
paper.” Mississippi’s Senator James Eastland was scarcely less
vitriolic: “The South will not abide by nor obey this legislative
decision by a political court.“1
In Florida, however, reaction was substantially different.
There was no immediate, widespread public outcry. Several newspaper editors and public officials urged Floridians to stay calm.
For example, Florida’s former governor and then senior Senator
Spessard Holland said he hoped the decision would be met with
“patience and moderation,” and that there would not be any
“violent repercussions” in the state.2 In an editorial, the Tampa
Morning Tribune held that the Brown decision was inevitable
and should be accepted, even while calling it “deplorable” because it overturned law, custom, and social order in states maintaining segregation.3 By and large, however, Floridians seemed to
have relatively little to say about the decision in the days and
weeks immediately following it.
*

Mr. Colburn is assistant professor of social sciences and history, and Mr.
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1. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954.
2. Joseph A. Tomberlin, “Florida Whites and the Brown Decision of 1954,”
Florida Historical Quarterly, LI (July 1972), 32.
3. Tampa Morning Tribune, May 19, 1954.
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The reasons for this mild response were to be found in the
state’s social and economic structure. Florida had a relatively
small percentage of blacks (21.8 per cent in 1950) when compared
to its southern neighbors.4 As V. O. Key, Jr. pointed out in his
Southern Politics in State and Nation, the smaller the percentage
of blacks in a state’s population, the less chance there is for intense racial animosities. In addition, the diversity of Florida’s
population, with many immigrants from the northeast and midwest settling in the urbanized, southern region of the state,
tended to moderate racial hostility. Florida’s heavy economic dependence on tourism also provided a steadying influence that
helped explain the mild response to the Court’s decision.
But this is not to say that the Brown decision had little impact
in Florida. Indeed, in the spring of 1954 Florida was one of only
four states with no school integration whatsoever, and thus the
Court’s action had grave implications for the state’s traditional
5
pattern of public education. It had equal importance. for Florida’s politics. Prior to 1954 race played a relatively small role in
Florida politics, but ever since, Florida governors have found
themselves confronted by a variety of racial problems involving
integration, civil rights, and busing.
Florida’s governors have been in a position as legislative, executive, and moral leaders to assist the public’s acceptance of these
issues. However, while no Florida governor urged passage of an
interposition resolution or conducted a persistent policy to exclude blacks from white schools in the manner of other southern
governors, only two chief executives— LeRoy Collins and Reubin
Askew— have made a strong effort to ease racial turmoil in the
state in the last two decades.
Although Collins had endorsed segregation in his gubernatorial campaigns of 1954 and 1956, his emphasis on peacefulness
and upholding the law suggested that he was more flexible on
racial issues than were many of his fellow public officials. His
4.

Florida’s southern neighbors had a much larger black population in 1954.
For instance, blacks made up 32 per cent of the population in Alabama,
39 per cent in South Carolina, 46 per cent in Mississippi, and 31 per cent
in Georgia. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1950,
Volume II , Characteristics of the Population (Washington, 1952), Part 2,
Alabama, p. 27; Part 10, Florida, p. 27; Part 11, Georgia, p. 35; Part 24,
Mississippi, p. 19; Part 40, South Carolina, p. 23.
5. Helen L. Jacobstein, The Segregation Factor in the Florida Democratic
Gubernatorial Primary of 1956 (Gainesville, 1972), 8.
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inaugural address on January 8, 1957, established a new tone in
Florida and, perhaps, throughout the South, on racial issues. He
told Floridians that integration was coming, and he urged the
people to accept it gracefully. He would preserve segregation, he
promised, as long as possible, but “the Supreme Court decisions
are the law of the land.” He added that whites must “face up to
the fact that the Negro does not now have equal opportunity”;
accordingly, blacks are “morally and legally entitled to progress
more rapidly.” Collins admitted that he did not have all the
answers to racial questions, but he added: “Haughtiness, arrogance, and forcing of issues will not produce the answer. Above
all, hate is not the answer.“6
Through his own rhetoric and actions he attempted to set
the course he hoped Florida and the South would follow. In a
speech before the Southern Governors’ Conference in 1957, he
declared the solution to racial problems is dependent “largely
upon bettering the living standards of Negro people. And these
improvements cannot be brought about in an atmosphere of
racial furor.“7 The November 25, 1957, issue of Time magazine
criticized Collins for being a man of words but not deeds on the
race issue. An examination of Collins’s relations with the legislature on race suggests that this was not true. During his last four
years in office Collins consistently emphasized through messages
to the legislature, the programs he submitted to it, his use of the
veto, and other actions that he was determined to steer Florida
on a course of moderation.
Collins’s legislative program on race began with his acceptance
of the Fabisinski Committee proposals in July 1956. The committee, which Collins had appointed in the spring, was charged
with finding and recommending ways of legally maintaining
segregation in Florida. 8 It proposed a four-point program permitting county school boards to assign pupils to schools on the
basis of individual needs; regulating the assignment of teachers;
giving the governor power to promulgate and enforce rules relat6. Inaugural Address, 1957, pp. 10, 12, in Box 1 (Speeches, January 8-April
2, 1957), LeRoy Collins Papers, 1955-1961, Florida Collection, Main Library, University of South Florida, Tampa. Hereinafter cited as LCP:
USF.
7. Transcript of News Conference, May 20, 1960, p. 1, in Box 4 (Speeches,
April 20-June 20,1960), LCP:USF.
8. Statement of LeRoy Collins to Conference on Segregation, March 21,
1956, in Box (8d) 3, LCP:USF.
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ing to the use of public parks, buildings, and other facilities
needed to maintain law and order, and to prevent domestic
violence; and clarifying the governor’s powers to declare an
emergency.9
Collins called a special legislative session in mid-July 1956 to
take up these recommendations which he publicly endorsed. He
announced that he would not accept any programs dealing with
segregation except those which the committee and he were proposing. 10 But some legislators, especially Representatives Prentice
P. Pruitt of Monticello and J. Kenneth Ballinger of Tallahassee,
resented Collins’s tone and position. They wanted to introduce
strong anti-integration laws, and they resisted the idea that only
Collins’s bills could be considered by the legislature. His proposals on segregation were quickly passed, but the legislature
persisted in considering more stringent measures.11 Collins feared
the potential divisiveness of these discussions, and he felt they
could push the state into a direct confrontation with the federal
government on race which he wanted to avoid. Accordingly, on
August 1, he adjourned the legislature, using as his justification
a little-known constitutional provision empowering the governor
to adjourn the legislature when both houses could not agree on a
time. When news of Collins’s action reached the floor of the legislature, Representative C. Farris Bryant of Ocala was in the middle of a speech introducing an interposition resolution. It was
precisely this kind of measure Collins wanted to avoid.12
During the 1957 regular session of the legislature the governor
tried to continue his moderate racial policies. In his speech
opening the session, he called for only one additional law on
race, and none on segregation. He felt the bills passed the previous summer provided Florida with sufficient resources to handle
its racial problems. 13 The legislature, however, had other ideas,
and proceeded to give Collins his only major defeat on racial
matters. An interposition resolution was passed by a near unani9.
10.

Tampa Morning Tribune, July 17, 1956.
Message to the Legislature— Extraordinary Session, July 23, 1956, pp.
33-34, in Box (8d) 3, LCP:USF.
11. Tampa Morning Tribune, July 27, 28, 1956.
12. Interview with LeRoy Collins, Tallahassee, February 11, 1975, tape (FLA
PER 38ABC) and transcript in University of Florida Oral History
Archives, Florida State Museum, Gainesville.
13. Message to the Legislature, January 8, 1957, p. 14, in Box 1 (Speeches,
January 8-April 2,1957), LCP:USF.
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mous vote over the governor’s strong objections. Collins had no
power to veto such a measure. However, he wrote a note registering his opposition directly on the resolution; he observed that
what the legislature had done “stultifies our state” and concluded,
“It will do no good whatever and those who say it can perpetrate
a cruel hoax on the people.“14 Collins did, however, veto the socalled “last resort” school bill passed by the 1957 legislature; it
would have closed the schools rather than integrate them.15 He
did sign the only racial measure he requested from the 1957 regular session which established a governor’s racial advisory
group.16 He also signed a bill passed by the October special
session, requiring that public schools be closed if federal troops
were sent in to force integration.17
In 1959 the legislature considered thirty-three anti-school
integration bills. Some of these were drastic: they would have
created systems of private schools financed with state funds;
others would have closed the schools rather than integrate them.
Another bill would have made teaching in an integrated school
a criminal offense. Collins and his legislative supporters, however, succeeded in blocking the bills in committee or in defeating
them on the floor. When the session adjourned, no bills had been
passed which significantly affected Florida’s moderate racial
policy. 18
Collins sought minimal and moderate legislation on race. His
emphasis, moreover, was on preventing legislative excesses on
racial matters; he was determined to keep Florida from following
the path of some of its southern neighbors. Thus, by taking a
negative view of much that the legislature wanted to do, Collins
was able to prevent the state from taking an extremist position on
race. Even though he managed to maintain moderate racial policies throughout his administration, he did not bring about significant school desegregation. Indeed, Collins was pledged to
maintain segregation in the public schools, but he repeatedly insisted that the pupil placement law was the only legal way to do

14. Typescript of Governor LeRoy Collins’s Statement, Accession 68-02, Part
9, Box 336, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee.
15. Tampa Morning Tribune, June 7, 1957.
16. Ibid., June 4, 1957.
17. Tampa Sunday Tribune, October 13, 1957.
18. Tampa Tribune, June 6, 1959.
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so. When he left office in 1961, only one school district (Dade
County) was desegregated.
Collins of course was criticized in some circles for not pushing harder on school desegregation. The fact is, however, that he
did make an effort to convince local school officials that some
school desegregation should be attempted at a time when the
federal government was applying no pressure on the state to do so.
In part he felt that some desegregation would strengthen the legal
foundation of the pupil placement law. But he also began to
realize that school desegregation was inevitable.19 During the fall
of 1958 Collins met quietly on several occasions with local school
officials. to secure their coperation in a limited effort to desegregate some schools. 20 Financial inducements and assistance were
apparently offered to cooperating districts. By mid-December,
however, Collins stopped these discussions. He said no volunteer
district or community could be found, and he felt that there was
no place in the state where school desegregation could be accomplished without provoking resentment and violence. Thus,
he declined to push the issue further, maintaining that decisions
regarding school desegregation would have to come from local
districts.21 In mid-February 1959, Dade County did announce
that four black students would be enrolled in an all-white elementary school. Collins applauded the decision, although he
noted it was purely a local one.22
In desegregation of higher education Collins’s record is also
mixed. He led the fight in 1956 to keep Virgil Hawkins, a black,
out of the University of Florida College of Law. He even promised to plead the state’s case before the United States Supreme
Court if necessary.23 However, in late January 1959, Collins proposed that graduate programs at Florida A & M University be
closed in favor of creating integrated ones at Florida State University and the University of Florida. He maintained that the
cost of operating graduate programs made this the most realistic
course of action.24 However, his proposal was immediately atInterview with LeRoy Collins, Tallahassee, February 11, 1975.
Tampa Tribune, December 17, 1958.
Ibid., December 19, 1958.
Ibid., February 19, 1959.
Statement of LeRoy Collins to Conference on Segregation, March 21,
1956, in Box (8d) 3, LCP:USF.
24. Tampa Tribune, January 30, 1959.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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tacked. House Speaker-designate Thomas Beasley said there was
“no chance” Florida A & M programs would be shut down, holding that the “people of Florida are willing to pay whatever is
necessary to maintain segregation.“25 It was in the face of this
kind of resistance and threats of violence that Collins elected not
to force the desegregation of Florida’s public educational facilities.26
The three governors that succeeded LeRoy Collins had taken
strong stands in their campaigns against integration, civil rights,
and busing. Not surprisingly, they made little effort to promote
racial equality in Florida. Farris Bryant, who succeeded Collins,
had announced his intention of reappointing Collins’s statewide
bi-racial advisory committee with Cody Fowler, a Tampa lawyer,
27
again serving as chairman. Fowler refused to accept the appointment. Bryant announced he had chosen a successor to
Fowler, but he refused to name him.28 The committee was subsequently dissolved.
Governor Bryant also blocked federal programs which appeared to be designed, at least in part, to promote integration.
Thus, he opposed federal aid to education in Florida because
the state might be forced to submit to federal integration guidelines in order to receive federal funds.29 Additionally, Bryant refused to let the state cooperate in a study of equal job opportunities for blacks as requested by the Civil Rights Commission.30
Under Governor Burns there were few changes in the racial
policies established by Bryant. Burns made no effort to establish
a bi-racial advisory committee and took few steps to promote
racial harmony. In addition, he was a leading critic of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965.
To the credit of both governors, they took no militant steps
to block school integration. While Governors Ross Barnett of
Mississippi and George Wallace of Alabama tried personally to
25. Ibid., January 31, 1959.
26. Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., in “The Supreme Court and School Desegregation: Twenty Years Later,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXXIX (Winter
1974-1975), 751-56, points out that the federal government was not pressuring Florida to desegregate its schools during the Collins years. Collins’s
efforts were made strictly on his own initiative.
27. Miami Herald, February 28, 1961.
28. Tampa Tribune, February 28, 1961.
29. Ibid., March 1, 1961.
30. Race Relations, 1962, in Box 412, Farris Bryant Papers, Florida State
Archives, Tallahassee,
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halt school integration in their states, Bryant and Burns allowed
it to take place gradually and quietly. During Bryant’s administration, for instance, twenty Florida counties integrated their
public schools. He refused to make inflammatory statements on
local school issues despite pressure from his political supporters.
An opponent of strong federal and state government, Bryant
argued: “It’s the American way to leave the solution to people
in their areas.“31 In addition, although both men relied on racial
appeals to win their elections, none of Florida’s governors resorted to such emotional or demagogic rhetoric once they were
in office. Burns appointed several blacks to office, including
Clifton Dyson, the first black man to sit on the Board of Regents,
and allowed the desegregation of the state’s schools to continue.
He also denounced prejudice and bigotry in his first message to
the legislature, arguing they had “no place in our government.“32
Claude Kirk’s election in 1966 offered little change in the
racial politics pursued by Bryant and Burns. Although he had
campaigned against busing to achieve school desegregation, Kirk
also had played down racial issues by alleging: “I won’t even
admit there’s a problem. We don’t have color in Florida.“33
Despite the flamboyance and theatrics of his first three years in
office, he initiated few racial programs or policies that set his
administration apart from the Bryant and Burns years.
The election of Reubin O’D. Askew in 1970 brought about a
change in the leadership provided by Florida governors during
the 1960s. Elected on a reform platform, Askew promised in his
inaugural address: “Equal rights for all our peoples, rural as well
as urban, black as well as white.“34 Askew entered office in the
midst of the busing controversy. He personally felt that the emotional controversy over busing would further damage the public
school system by speeding up the white exodus to private schools.
In late August 1971, he received a petition with 40,000 signatures
31. When Bryant became governor in January 1961, only Dade County had
integrated its schools. By the fall of 1964, Volusia, Broward, Palm Beach,
Hillsborough, Monroe, Sarasota, Pinellas, Orange, Escambia, Charlotte,
Duval, Leon, Okaloosa, St. Johns, Santa Rosa, Alachua, Bay, Brevard,
Marion, and Lee counties had integrated their schools. At that 6,652
black students were attending bi-racial classes in 170 schools. Southern
School News, May 1964, p. 10; September 1964, p. 7.
32. Tampa Tribune, April 7, 1965.
33. Ibid., July 18, 1967.
34. Tampa Tribune, January 6, 1971.
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asking him to request Congress to call a constitutional convention to prohibit busing as a means of achieving racial balance in
the public schools. In response to this proposal, Governor Askew
told a summer graduating class at the University of Florida that
busing was “an artificial and inadequate instrument of change.
Nobody really wants it— not you, not me, not the people, not the
school board, not even the courts.” However, he went on to say
“the law demands, and rightly so, that we put an end to segregation in our society,” and he saw busing as a necessary element
in achieving this goal.35
Askew’s speech was made more remarkable by Governor
George Wallace’s appearance in Jacksonville, barely seventy miles
away. To a cheering crowd of thousands, Wallace said President
Nixon would force him to run for President if he did not halt
busing by executive order. At the same time, former Governor
Claude Kirk was leading a Parents Against Forced Busing group
in Pinellas County.36
In February 1972, the Florida legislature, meeting in special
session, took up the busing issue and quickly passed a measure
adding it to the presidential primary ballot of March 14. The
straw vote asked Floridians if they would support a constitutional
amendment prohibiting forced busing. Governor Askew agreed to
sign it, but only after the legislature dropped the adjective
“forced” and agreed to a companion referendum asking voters
if they supported quality education for all and opposed a return
to a dual system of public schools.37
Apparently determined to prove to himself and the nation
that Florida was not a racist state, Askew raised $32,000 to conduct a speaking tour and persuaded Florida’s religious leaders to
join him in the campaign. With remarks that he would repeat
throughout his tour, Askew reiterated. his personal dislike of busing to a crowd at a state fair in Orlando. Yet, he emphasized,
through “busing and other methods, we’ve made real progress in
dismantling a dual system of public schools in Florida.” Racial
issues, he noted, had frequently obscured the more important
“economic and environmental problems of the people, both black
and white. . . . It’s time we told the rest of the nation that we
35.
36.
37.

Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, September 5, 1971.
St. Petersburg Times, August 29, 1971.
Gainesville Sun, February 21, 1972.
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aren’t caught up in the mania to stop busing at any cost . . . ,
that we know the real issues when we see them, and that we no
longer will be fooled, frightened, and divided against ourselves.“38
The straw ballot showed that the anti-busing resolution had
been supported by Floridians three to one. However, the straw
vote on equal opportunity for all children regardless of race,
creed, or color passed by an even wider margin of four to one.39
The results were only a partial victory for Askew. Most critics of
integration, including Wallace supporters in Florida, had apparently decided that a negative vote on the second issue would
have little influence on Washington, and, perhaps, even undermine their opposition to busing since Congress and President
Nixon would probably view such opposition as racially motivated. Nevertheless, Askew’s efforts had gained him and Florida
much favorable publicity throughout the nation, only part of
which was diminished by the results of the straw vote.
Askew’s legacy to improved racial relations in Florida has
gone well beyond his leadership in the busing issue. Upon taking
office, he authorized an employee survey which disclosed that the
vast majority of black employees in state government held menial
positions and more than eighty-nine per cent were receiving wages
40
below the poverty level. Shortly thereafter, Askew issued an executive order establishing an affirmative action plan to correct
the under-representation and under-utilization of blacks in state
government. The first progress report published in 1972 revealed
that the number of blacks in state government had doubled and
that blacks had attained several responsible positions.41 Askew’s
campaign against the busing referendum and his appointment of
blacks to prominent positions in state government appears to
have helped alleviate the frustrations of black Floridians and
Speech at Central Florida Fair, Orlando, February 21, 1972, Reubin O’D.
Askew Papers, Office of the Governor, Capitol Building, Tallahassee. See
also Miami Herald, February 22, 1972.
39. Tampa Tribune, March 15, 1972. Some scholars argue that the antibusing sentiment is not based solely on racial motivations. For instance,
Jonathan Kelley in “The Politics of School Busing,” Public Opinion
Quarterly, XXXVIII (Spring 1974), 23-39, declares that the public is
much more concerned with the distance their children travel to school
and the condition of the school they will be bused to than they are with
the integration of the classrooms.
40. Interview with Reubin O’D. Askew, Tallahassee, January 10, 1975.
41. “Equality of Opportunity: Askew Administration in Motion,” memorandum. Reubin O’D. Askew Papers, Office of the Governor, Capitol Building, Tallahassee.
38.
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restore racial tranquility to the state. Acts of racial violence have
virtually disappeared from the public scene in the 1970s.42
Progress in race relations made under Askew’s leadership
points out the important role a governor can play in affecting the
state’s racial environment. The meaning of executive leadership
was never more evident than during the racial turmoil of the
1950s and 1960s. It was Collins’s leadership in the late 1950s
which prevented the sit-in demonstrations from deteriorating
into violent confrontations. In 1956 and 1957, the NAACP attempted to desegregate the buslines in Tallahassee. Collins denounced this effort as a “miscarriage of ambition”; he argued
that blacks should be concerned “with other conditions of far
more importance than where people sit on buses.“43 In January
1957, he suspended Tallahassee bus service for nearly two weeks
in order to preserve public order after rocks were thrown and
shots were fired at the homes of blacks involved in the desegregation effort.44
Collins expressed the same attitude toward lunch-counter
sit-in demonstrations in 1960. Daytona Beach, Tallahassee,
Tampa, Sarasota, and St. Petersburg all had sit-in demonstrations
early that year. Collins, who was strongly motivated by legal considerations, stated: “I hate to see demonstrations of this kind.
They lead to disorder. Disorder leads to danger to the general
welfare and I hope we will not have any more of it.“45 He appealed directly to the people of Florida to restore racial harmony:
“We must find responsible community leaders who can provide
leadership for social adjustments which we must make.“46
But while he was sharply critical of the tactics of blacks,
Collins reserved strong language also for white Floridians who
refused to recongize the winds of change, and particularly those
who continued to engage in the repression of minority groups.
When a synagogue and a black elementary school in Jacksonville
were bombed in late April 1958, Collins was outraged: “This is
not just an invasion of the personal and property rights of those
directly injured. It is a serious crime against every citizen of
42. The 1975 black demonstrations in Pensacola against the shooting of a
black youth by a deputy sheriff has been the notable exception.
43. Tallahassee Democrat, July 3, 1956.
44. Ibid., January 2, 1957.
45. Tampa Tribune, March 4, 1960.
46. Ibid., March 18, 1960.
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Florida. It is a trampling underfoot of the freedom and security
of American justice. Anyone who would perpetrate a wrong like
this has such a diabolical mind and intent that he is a common
enemy of all, regardless of race, color, or religion.“47
At the same time that he was openly criticizing black sit-down
tactics in the spring of 1960, he went before the public on television to express his thoughts on segregation. He reiterated his
commitment to law and order. But he also stated what was unquestionably a unique view for a Florida governor. Collins said
he believed it was “unfair and morally wrong” for white store
owners to encourage black patronage of some departments in
their establishments but to deny them service in others. Legally,
he said, they can do that, “But I still don’t think [the store
owners] can square that right with moral, simple justice.“48
Later that year, 1960, when severe racial turmoil flared in
Jacksonville, Collins went personally to the city to see what could
be done. He observed that the violence may have been between
“colored trash and white trash,” but all the people of the city
must share the blame: “I am sure it must be easily observable to
the people of Jacksonville that conditions there are not what they
should be in the Negro community. Their housing is extremely
poor. Their recreational facilities are extremely limited, and
certainly the people of Jacksonville have been aware that there
has been growing tension over the last several months. You cannot try to sweep the trash under the slums and expect to avoid
difficulties, because slums breed difficulties, slums breed crime,
vice, and disorder.“49 Collins’s fairness and moral suasion were
instrumental in bringing a temporary halt to sit-in demonstrations in Florida.
In the summer of 1963 the sit-in demonstrations and antisegregation marchers came to St. Augustine, Florida. In several
violent and near violent encounters between whites and blacks,
one white was killed, four blacks were wounded, and many were
injured. The racial disorders eased during the fall and winter.
In the spring of 1964 Dr. Robert Hayling, a black dentist and St.
Augustine leader of the NAACP, invited northern college stu47. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, April 29, 1958.
48. Transcript of Statewide Television-Radio Talk to the People of Florida
on Race Relations, March 20, 1960, in Box 4 (Speeches, March 17-April
13, 1960), LCP:USF.
49. Tampa Tribune, September 2, 1960.
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dents to come to St. Augustine during the spring to help with
the “struggle for human rights.“50 Hundreds of students and
newsmen began arriving in early March to prepare for the expected confrontation with the local police and citizenry.
Governor Farris Bryant had already made it clear to Floridians, both during his campaign and after, that he opposed sitdown demonstrations. He argued in the campaign that sit-ins
violated the right of private property and the “fundamental constitutional guarantee that no citizen’s property shall be taken
from him without due process of law.“51 He also stated before
the United States Senate Commerce Committee that if a traveler
is free not to buy because he does not like the owner’s mustache,
accent or race, “the owner of the property ought to have the same
freedom. That’s simple justice.“52
When the demonstrations began in St. Augustine in April 1964,
the local police quickly arrested the demonstrators, including
Mrs. George Endicott Peabody, mother of the governor of Massachusetts. Violence ensued when white mobs pelted anti-segregation marchers with rocks and bottles. As the confrontations
among police, white militants, and integrationists accelerated,
Martin Luther King, Jr., promised “a massive assault on segregation” in the city with a nonviolent army from Savannah, Birmingham, and Wilmington, North Carolina. Bryant, who was attending a national governor’s conference in Cleveland, Ohio, condemned the violence, but he only sent in forty-five state troopers
to assist the embattled local police force. He refused to allow
United States marshals to intervene.53
Events in St. Augustine worsened when King arrived to direct
the integrationist drive and J. B. Stoner, an Atlanta Klansman,
showed up to lead the segregationists. Adding to the confusion,
Sheriff L. O. Davis of St. Augustine named Halsted R. “Hoss”
50. Florida, Legislature, Investigation Committee, Racial and Civil Disorders
in St. Augustine, Report of the Legislative Investigation Committee (Tallahassee, 1965), 33. Also see Robert Wayne Hartley, “A Long, Hot Summer: The St. Augustine Racial Disorders of 1964” (M.A. thesis, Stetson
University, 1972).
51. “Farris Bryant Scores with TV Speech,” p. 1, in Around the Clock with
Bryant, I, no. 4 (April 4, 1960), bound in Farris Bryant’s “Platform and
Campaign Literature,” P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University
of Florida, Gainesville.
52. “Remarks by the Honorable Farris Bryant, Governor of Florida, Before
the Senate Commerce Committee, July 29, 1963,” copy in P. K. Yonge
Library.
53. Miami Herald, June 11, 1964.
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Manucy, leader of the “Ancient City Hunting Club” and a militant segregationist, one of his special deputies to maintain order
in St. Augustine. 54 Bryant visited the area and described it as
“very explosive and very tense.“55 He ordered an additional eighty
troopers into the area, and issued an order banning night demonstrations. The latter, however, was overturned by Federal Judge
Bryan Simpson who suggested instead “enforcement, arrests and
charges against these hoodlums [segregationists] everybody seems
afraid of.“56
Violence erupted again when white militants assaulted a
group attempting to integrate St. Augustine Beach. There followed a series of wade-ins at the beach and at swimming pools at
motels in town. Governor Bryant then announced the establishment of a four-man bi-racial committee of St. Augustine citizens
to restore communications between blacks and whites.57 Conditions in St. Augustine were still tense when President Lyndon
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act on July 2. The new law
forbade discrimination in all places of public accommodation
such as hotels, restaurants, and theatres. It also served as a
catalyst which threatened to disrupt the fragile truce in St.
Augustine as militant whites bitterly denounced it. Adding to the
confusion was Governor Bryant’s statement that he felt the same
about civil rights as he did about taxes— “I don’t propose to collect taxes and I don’t propose to enforce civil rights.“58
Shortly after Bryant’s announcement, segregationists began
enlisting business support to refuse service to blacks. Dr. King
returned to St. Augustine and promised to march and protest
until the law was obeyed. Bryant, meanwhile, had neither convened his bi-racial advisory committee nor appointed any members. Federal Judge Bryan Simpson, however, took control of
events in St. Augustine through a series of injunctions and
orders.59
Governor Bryant’s role in the St. Augustine crisis had done
little to improve black-white relations. Even after the crisis was
David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Ku
Klux Klan, 1865-1965 (Garden City, New York, 1965), 377-79.
5 5 . Tampa Tribune, June 27, 1964.
56. Ibid., June 14, 1964.
57. Racial and Civil Disorders in St. Augustine, 22.
58. Tampa Tribune, July 11, 1964.
59. Racial and Civil Disorders in St. Augustine, 23.
54.
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resolved, civil rights leaders remained critical. Rutledge Pearson,
president of the NAACP in Florida, remarked that compliance
with the Civil Rights Act in Florida had been “encouraging.”
He added, however, that “It would help if the governor of
Florida would take a position of upholding the law, and encouraging people to obey it.“60
With the settlement of the St. Augustine crisis, racial tensions
appeared to be solved in Florida. In fact, of course, they had
only subsided temporarily. The reasons for racial conflict were
still present: law enforcement discrimination, poverty, economic
discrimination, inadequate schools, and high unemployment. In
1967 the calm that had characterized Florida’s racial relations for
three years came to an abrupt halt. Within the space of a few
summer months, black Floridians in seven cities took to the
streets, openly challenging the police and civil authority, and, in
the process, destroying property and injuring several dozen
people. While the riots in Florida paled in comparison to the
violence and destruction of Newark or Detroit, they still shocked
most Floridians. Particularly startling was the riot in Tampa
which lasted four days and was ranked by the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders as one of the most intense in the
nation.61
The causes of the riots in Tampa, Clearwater, St. Petersburg,
West Palm Beach, Deerfield Beach, Lakeland, and Riviera Beach
were complex and often unique to their particular areas. But the
failure of Florida’s governors in the 1960s to recommend any programs that might alleviate the general plight of the poor did
nothing to ease the sources of black frustration and anger. Claude
Kirk, who was governor during this period, responded to the
crisis by deploying National Guardsmen when requested by local
officials. He also visited the areas. In Tampa at a church meeting
of 200 blacks, he called for an end to the looting and violence.
In return he promised a thorough investigation of the shooting
of a black youth by police. It was this death that had sparked
the riot. Kirk’s promise appears to have had a temporizing effect
on the black community, although the riot could well have run
its course by this time.62
60. Miami Herald, July 12, 1964.
61. U. S. Kerner Commission, Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (New York, 1968), 158.
62. Tampa Tribune, June 14, 1967.
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Somewhat later, Governor Kirk commended 130 black youths
from Tampa who had patrolled the riot area urging blacks to
stop the violence and return to their homes. However, he made
no recommendations in 1967 or thereafter to the legislature that
might have improved the social and economic conditions of the
poor. Instead he supported the enactment of one of the harshest
anti-riot laws in the country, which made rioting a felony punishable by up to two years in prison. 63 Kirk also involved himself in
the Manatee County school desegregation controversy of 1970.
In January, United States District Court Judge Ben Krentzman
ordered Manatee school officials to begin busing students to
achieve a ratio of eighty per cent white to twenty per cent black
students in each school. When the judge’s order went into effect
on April 6, Kirk responded by suspending both the school board
and Superintendent of Schools Jack L. Davidson, and by personally seizing control of the schools. It was alleged that Kirk was
seeking to bolster his gubernatorial re-election bid in 1970 and to
test President Richard Nixon’s statement which criticized busing.
Judge Krentzman ordered the schools returned to the county
school officials and Governor Kirk to appear before him to explain his actions. Kirk refused to appear, claiming Krentzman
had “overstepped his bounds.” He also defied the court by again
suspending both educational bodies. Kirk warned federal officials
that there might be a loss of life if they attempted to serve him
with a subpoena. On April 11, Krentzman found Kirk guilty of
contempt and fined him $10,000 a day until he surrendered control of Manatee County’s schools. The following day the governor
bowed to the judge’s demands and directed the school board to
implement Krentzman’s desegregation order.64
The governor’s actions during these periods of racial turmoil
suggests that the racial climate in Florida had been effectively
moderated or worsened depending on the quality of his leadership. While the Brown decision did generate white resistance and
hostility in Florida, as it did in other southern states, Collins’s
leadership enabled Floridians to avoid the difficult adjustments
experienced in such places as Alabama and Mississippi. The
63.

New York Times, July 27, 1967. See also Neal R. Peirce, The Deep South
States of America: People, Politics, and Power in the Seven Deep South
States (New York, 1974), 449.
64. New York Times, April 6-13, 1970. See also Tampa Tribune, April 6-13,
1970.
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gubernatorial leadership of the 1960s on race never matched that
provided by Collins. However, Bryant and Burns did manage to
steer Florida through troubled waters without resorting to
demagoguery. Neither was Kirk a demagogue. The Manatee crisis
of April 1970 stands in marked contrast to the other policies his
administration pursued. Nevertheless, the problems encountered
by Claude Kirk, as well as Farris Bryant and Haydon Burns,
pointed out the inherent contradiction of a candidate pursuing
a racially-oriented campaign, and trying to provide positive,
peaceful leadership on racial issues once in office. A governor who
had resorted to emotional appeals was unprepared and illequipped to deal wth racial turmoil. During a period of crisis,
such as that encountered in St. Augustine in 1963-1964 and in
Manatee in 1970, such a leader found himself mistrusted by the
black community and unable to appease his white constituents
without using the police power of the state.
Reubin Askew has benefited from the lessons of the 1950s and
1960s, as well as from the changing public attitudes on race. As a
result, his administration to date (1976) has achieved a new
plateau on race relations. The question today is no longer
whether the Florida governor will assume a racist posture, but
whether he will pursue programs and policies broad enough in
scope to permit black Floridians to participate fully and equally
in the range of opportunities the state can provide.
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